Abstract: In terms of geological shifts in climate, climate policy is a very young field. However, during the last two decades it has developed at a rapid pace. In 1987, the Brundtland Report first used the concept of sustainable development, followed in 1988 by the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Toronto. The establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 marked the birth of global climate policy. For the first time in history governments of almost all nations gathered to discuss the effects and consequences of and measures to be taken against global warming and agreed on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". The first decade of climate policy culminated in 1997 in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, in which industrialized countries (37 so-called "Annex B countries"), agreed to reduce anthropogenic emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5.2% below 1990 levels during the
Introduction
In terms of geological shifts in climate, climate policy is a very young field. However, during the last two decades it has developed at a rapid pace. In 1987, the Brundtland Report first used the concept of sustainable development, followed in 1988 by the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Toronto. The establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 marked the birth of global climate policy. 1 For the first time in history governments of almost all nations gathered to discuss the effects and consequences of and measures to be taken against global warming and agreed on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" 2 . The first decade of climate policy culminated in 1997 in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, in which industrialized countries (37 so-called "Annex B countries"), agreed to reduce anthropogenic emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 5.2% below 1990 levels during the Kyoto commitment period, 2008 -2012 (Article 3, UNFCCC, 1997 . 3 At the same time, developing countries, agreed to provide GHG inventory reports. As abatement of a ton of CO 2 eq. is equally effective for the global climate irrespective of the location of abatement, 1 The UNFCCC was signed May 9 th , 1992 as part of the UN Conference on Development and Environment (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro and entered into force March, 1994 . By early 2008 nations have ratified the UNFCCC, while 154 nations had signed the UNFCCC in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro.
according to economic theory emissions should be reduced where the marginal cost of abatement is lowest (Dales, 1968; Coase, 1960) International Emissions Trading (IET) allows governments of countries with commitments to sell unused shares of their emissions budgets, so called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), to other countries that want to use more AAUs than they have been assigned in the Kyoto
Protocol. The second mechanism, Joint Implementation (JI), permits the generation of emissions credits through emission reduction projects in an Annex-I country. These credits can be used by the acquiring (Annex B) country to fulfil its Kyoto commitments; an equivalent amount has to be deducted from the emissions budget of the country hosting the projects to avoid double counting (Michaelowa, 1995; Metz, 1995, Geres and . The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I countries that do not have an emissions budget to generate emission credits that can be used by countries that have commitments. Finally, the CDM is the only instrument of the Kyoto Protocol that started before 2008. CDM credits (so-called Certified Emission
Reductions, CERs) can be generated from 2000 onwards if early and serious consideration of the CDM in the planning of the project can be proven (Michaelowa et al. 2007 ). Due to the fact that all actors involved in CDM projects have an incentive to overstate emission reductions, there is a detailed body of rules whose implementation is checked through independent audits. A cornerstone of the rules is the principle of additionality, i.e. that a CDM project would not have happened without the CER incentive 6 .
The Kyoto Mechanisms are the most innovative feature of the Kyoto Protocol and therefore particularly prone to impacts of uncertainty regarding general stability of climate policies, rules for mechanism implementation and performance of projects under the project-based mechanisms. We focus on the CDM to illustrate the effect of those uncertainties. First, we identify sources of uncertainty at the policy, project and institutional level. We then look at their impact on the Kyoto market as a whole and provide recommendations for improvement.
Section 2 deals with uncertainty in international climate policy and domestic climate policy of large players, especially regarding the lifetime of the Kyoto Protocol regime and domestic incentives for use of certified emission reductions. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the current CDM market and introduces the effect of real and perceived policy uncertainties on CER prices. Furthermore, the quality and performance of CDM projects, both of which are major determinants driving the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the mechanism are analyzed as an additional factor. Performance of the CDM in general and of specific project types in particular can give substantial price signals as some domestic climate policy instruments only accept certain types of CERs. Section 4 assesses external and internal actors in the Kyoto system and analyses how these actors influence the price of carbon. Moreover, this section makes recommendations to enhance transparency and regulatory stability. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
Uncertainty in International Climate Policy
The key uncertainty on the international level is whether an international regime is applicable and binding, and for how long it lasts.
The Kyoto Protocol initiated the "period orientation" of climate policy. were traded at a turnover of € 89 billion (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010) . In part II, we will discuss the key role of the emission allowance price for the pricing of certified emission reductions. In this context, a recent decision by the EU to severely restrain CER imports has 8 Interestingly, 39 CDM projects were submitted before Russia´s ratification, showing that some market actors were willing to take up the Kyoto risk. 9 Michaelowa and Koch (2002) examine Russia's possible reasons, including interest group rent seeking and Duma power issues, for not having ratified the protocol despite generous counting of sinks (and doubling of these sinks in Marrakech) and allocation of "hot air" permits (Michaelowa and Koch, 2002 pp. 563) . Bernard, Paltsev, Reilly, Vielle and Viguier (2003) show in their paper using computable general equilibrium models how Russia faces a trade-off to maximise their revenue from emission permits versus the revenue from fossil energy exports.
had a negative influence on the CER price. The EU is clearly aware of its key role in the Kyoto Market and willing to use this as a negotiation tool. This increases uncertainty in the market, as the market is "taken hostage" of political interests. As the Kyoto Mechanisms and the resulting carbon market have entirely been established by government intervention, political decisions can in principle create new demand and similarly take away demand with a stroke of a pen (Michaelowa, 1998 The aspect of uncertainty about the future post-2012, even though the current CDM market is blooming, leads to a saw-tooth curve of uncertainty in which uncertainty about the potential follow-up post-2012 regime increases when approaching the end date of a period, without another follow-up treaty being decided. Similarly, uncertainty decreases when approaching the start date of a new period as more information enters the market and expectations are formed. This uncertainty is reflected in the volatility of the price for carbon. An optimal solution for the above problem is a series of commitment periods with established progress checks each period to give the right incentives to abate and invest also during the period rather than only at the beginning or the end. Given that climate treaties are international legal constructs in nature, sanctions, arbitration and other real enforcement mechanisms have to be in place to secure compliance. Also trade issues, involving competitive concerns of countries with and countries without strict environmental regulation have to be dealt with at the international level. Although enforcement and trade is beyond the scope of this text, it is interesting to note that a credible and working enforcement mechanism is a necessary condition for a good climate treaty and is able to diminish uncertainty about the environmental impact of the treaty. 12 Ultimately, the uncertainty about the concrete policy framework affects the price and volatility of carbon commodities, which is discussed in the following part after a brief introduction in the carbon market. give important signals for market participants. However, also decisions not taken or delayed by the COP/MOP can impact the market severely, depending on the respective issue. In the Kyoto Protocol, COP/MOP specified three distinct carbon commodities 13 :
-Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). When the allocation of AAUs was decided in the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol, Russia and Ukraine and countries of Eastern Europe got emission targets comparable to OECD countries. However, the economic transition and the related closure of heavy industries which occurred during the 1990s led to emissions decreases of 40 -70%. The overall surplus of these countries, the so-called hot air is estimated at 5-7 billion t CO 2 eq.. Its initial purpose was to provide the US with an easy way to reach its Kyoto target by agreeing on a bulk transfer of "hot air". This bargain did not work and the "hot air" is about twice to three times as large as the combined demand of all OECD countries. Thus, theoretically, the CDM market could be eliminated overnight as the "hot air" can always sell at a lower price than CDM project developers. However, the countries in transition lost several years in setting up the institutions for selling AAUs, while OECD governments were reluctant to buy "hot air" due to expected opposition from non-governmental organizations. This might change towards the end of the commitment period once governments face the need to comply and do not have the budget to buy expensive CERs.
12 A good enforcement mechanism ensures that the environmental integrity of the treaty is ensured. 13 Verified or Voluntary Emission Reductions (VERs), which belong to the voluntary market, are not part of the Kyoto compliance market. We will only look at the Kyoto market.
-Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) under Joint Implementation (JI). JI suffered from a late start of the institutions on the UN level and host country problems similar to those encountered for assigned amount unit trades 14 -Certified Emission Credits (CERs) under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
The CDM has the twin objective to reduce emissions and to contribute to sustainable development (SD) of the country in which the project is implemented.
A complex array of institutions has been set up after 2001 to guarantee the twin objective of environmental integrity and sustainable development of the CDM. At the core, the CDM 17 The Kyoto market developed a whole array of new terms and abbreviations. A glossary of terms is attached at the end of this article for reference. 18 Another challenge that can arise from such a multi-layer structure is the anti-commons problem, which means that certain players can delay progress if it is in their (rent-seeking) interest follow such a strategy. However, the rent-seeking argument loses some momentum as the governmentally established entities and their private counterparts are under high critical scrutiny by the public and the media (Buchanan and Yoon, 2002). The interaction of CDM institutions has an important impact on the investment and planning security of the system. This interaction will be assessed in section 4 of this chapter.
Pricing of emission credits
Differences in perceived uncertainties generated differences in pricing of different greenhouse gas market units right from the beginning. We show this by some examples before starting a systematic discussion why prices have not yet converged. Before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, prices for certified emission reductions from CDM projects reached only 3 $.
When the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme was decided, the price for EU allowances established itself at a much higher level -initially 8 € and later up to 30 € as the EU ETS was seen as a stable source of demand. The acceptance of CERs in the ETS generated certainty about their use and an increase in price followed. The EU Commission's threshold for the use of Kyoto Mechanisms credits for compliance is unlikely to be binding, but has been used as an argument for a price discount of Kyoto credits compared to a EUA.
For a long time, the lack of the "International Transaction Log" (ITL), which is required for transferring Kyoto units between registries of different countries has also been used as an argument for price differentiation between CERs and EUAs.
We see the following three conditions for price convergence of similar commodities:
transparency of the market, homogeneity of the product, free and undisrupted trade, following Jepma (2007) . The last two conditions are closely linked in case of the EU ETS and the CDM market: We discuss whether they are likely to emerge in the international greenhouse gas market.
In the EU ETS market the transparency of the market is dependent on the information about which installations in the market get how many allowances in which way and if the market has a surplus or a deficit of EU allowances. For example only after the verified and monitored emissions data of EU member states has been published for 2005, market participants realized that EUAs had been over-allocated (Buchner and Ellerman, 2006) . This led to a sudden price drop of allowances, from which they never recovered until the end of 2007.
In case of the CDM market, decisions taken by the institutions should be transparent and consistent. This is not always the case. For example, the "completeness check" of the documents submitted for registration of a CDM project by the UNFCCC Secretariat, in early The lowest tier has the buyer taking methodology, validation, registration and volume risk and a 50% forward payment. In the second tier, the seller takes the methodology and validation risk. In the third tier, the seller takes the registration risk, while the buyer pays on delivery and in the fourth tier the seller takes the volume risk. The price range within each tier was higher than the average price difference between tiers, showing the influence of project type and host country risks.
The homogeneity of the carbon commodities and free undisrupted trade are related subjects in the carbon trading universe. In principle homogeneity is established by the EU linking directive. In general terms, EUAs and CERs allow its holder to emit one ton of CO 2 eq. or to convert to such a right, respectively. In theory, CERs and EUAs should thus trade at the same price. However, it is notable that even issued CERs, for which no delivery risk exists, do trade at a discount to EUAs. A potential reason could be regulatory decisions, highlighted in Only with a 30% target, 0.9 billion t could be imported. Figure 2 shows the sharp increase of the differential between EUAs and CERs after the Commission announcement. Whereas the limit of CER credits is an arbitrary decision, which is at risk of being influenced by interest groups, it should be communicated in a transparent manner to enhance certainty for stakeholders.
The announcement by EU Commission representative Slingenberg that certified emission reductions should be calculated according to very stringent benchmarks, thus leading to a "de facto discount of CERs" did not have an adverse effect on price of issued CERs and EUAs, which have increased in the same time period due to high fossil fuel prices (GTZ CDM, 2008) . However, it can cast a chill on the development of new CDM projects.
Pricing in CER forward contract can be set as a combination of a weighted average of various factors, such as the actual EUA price at the time of CER delivery, an indexed price over a prespecified time period, a fixed price or various combinations of both (Streck & Freestone, 2005) . The huge pricing volatility, especially due to regulatory uncertainty, makes it difficult to secure a loan with the CER flows, especially if loan-providers expect the current system to be altered. Generally, the pricing of Kyoto credits depends on a multitude of issues involving energy prices, environmental regulation globally and domestically, risk perception and shifting, the behavior of large players and on decisions taken at the EU and UNFCCC level.
At each stage uncertainties can arise if the information revealed and the transparency of the market is incomplete. In the following the interaction of key market participants will be examined in light of their influence on uncertainty in the market.
Interaction of key actors in the Kyoto/CDM market and their influence and challenges with uncertainty
In the Kyoto market various actors influence, and are impacted by, uncertainty. External participants shape the rules of the market and internal participants act within the market.
However in some instances, external participants, especially if they are large, can impose or change the rules after which they themselves will act.
External market actors
Governments are involved at the COP/MOP level, but also at the supranational and at the domestic level implementing supportive policies to reach the Kyoto targets. They can directly join or to refrain from the CDM market or link the CDM to domestic policies such as the EU ETS. The duration of the third EU ETS phase has been specified as 2013 -2020 even before a post-2012 climate policy regime has been decided. The stringency of the third phase -and CER demand, if imports are allowed -depends on the degree of credibility/enforcement of the 20% energy efficiency improvement and 20% renewables targets for 2020. If companies with installations covered under the EU ETS replace them by renewable energy or reduce fossil electricity production due to a reduction in electricity demand, this leads to a reduction in demand for EUAs and CERs.
A counteracting effect is the learning effect in the production of renewables equipment, which increases as more of this equipment is demanded and installed. Moreover, through economies of scale this can also make technology more accessible to CDM project hosts and thus lead to an increase in the supply of credits.
Host governments of CDM projects can influence the functioning of the carbon market by giving project developers and external investors legal, investment and political security and assuring low or no barriers to technological transfer (Ellis and Kamel 2007) . Investors demand lower risk-adjusted returns and are more willing to invest in countries where their investments are protected by legally enforceable contracts and regulations. The political and regulatory stability across electoral cycles of host countries is an important issue for all investments including the CDM. Investors and project developers have to be assured that country specific rules impacting the CDM project are not changed retroactively. Similarly, many CDM projects require technology imports. Host countries, which are at the same time producers or even exporters of the respective technology might be inclined to protect their domestic market. These host countries are in the difficult position to reduce barriers for incoming technology or to give in to domestic interest groups.
Not only on the demand side, governments of large countries can influence the working of the market substantially by their regulatory decisions. For instance, China has set a price floor for
CERs. 21 The level of the floor is arbitrary and injects volatility into the market if the decision is not transparent and communicated accordingly. In theory, the effect of a price floor is that if the price floor is below the actual price of CERs, the floor is not binding and is a "safety net" for project developers, which are able to calculate with the price floor as the "worst case" 
Internal actors
Project developers, as the name suggest, plan and develop projects. A third party, intermediaries and traders, are linking buyers and sellers and help to make the market more efficient since intermediaries are able to gather more information than rational individual participants would do on their own. With this information intermediaries can time and structure the trades of carbon credits according to the market setting, and at the same time hedge themselves against risks in the market place. Traders have various income streams.
They gain through arbitrage with the price differential between EUAs and CERs, through a long (short) position in a bullish (bearish) market and through the commission fee. More competition in the market for intermediaries and traders induces higher informational efficiency of the market. Therefore, promoting a stable and healthy intermediary market reduces uncertainty. At the same time experience from securities and corporate markets has shown that market manipulations and accounting scandals can lead to a sudden downturn of the market. 24 A careful regulation of trading, market principles and optimized informational requirements decreases the volatility of the market and the risk of a sudden collapse.
Validators and verifiers are responsible for the validation of projects and subsequently of monitoring actual emissions from CDM projects. Although the actual work is not requiring much personnel per se, it requires specific engineering and technological expertise and skills.
Assuming a growing CDM market, in order to cope with the increasing demands of projects occurring worldwide, validators and verifiers should start to employ more personnel in the long-run. However, they do not do so because they fear that the CDM market might no longer 23 Energy providers have profited substantially during phase I of the EU ETS by free allocation of allowances by passing through the opportunity cost of allowances to consumers and other businesses. This has amounted by conservative estimates to about € 8-10 billion (Sijm et al. 2006; Cramton and Kerr 2002; Hepburn et al. 2006; Neuhoff et al. 2006) . Therefore, for 2013-2020 full auctioning for allowances to energy providers was envisaged before lobbying by East European states led to some exemptions. Auctioning gives a clear and credible signal to energy generators to change their investment behavior. 24 The 2008 financial crisis was caused by the sub-prime crisis in which mortgage obligations had been restructured multiple times with the help of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). The restructured product carried a better rating than its inherent risk level would suggest. As many CER transactions are structured with the help of SPVs, it is crucial for the credibility of the market to be assured of the quality and real risk of credits.
exist after 2012. Here it seems that the market does not signal clearly that the demand of CDM-specialized personnel will grow in the long-term.
Conclusion and final remarks
Climate policies and the related markets suffer from the inherent uncertainty that is generated by political decisions. Market participants and governments did not know for a long time whether the Kyoto Protocol would actually enter into force and currently the continuation of the climate policy regime after 2012 is unclear. Moreover, uncertainty is generated through inconsistent application of rules by the institutions governing the market mechanisms, and random or opaque rule changes. Domestic and supranational regulation by big players such as the European Union can send both adverse and supporting signals to the market. Finally, there
is an important uncertainty about the quality of mitigation projects and their actual performance, which influences the willingness of project developers and investors to undertake such investments. All these elements of uncertainty influence the carbon market price through changes in supply of and demand for emission credits.
In contrast to markets that trade a tangible commodity, markets for CERs can be created and destroyed with a stroke of a pen. This leads to extreme short-term orientation, rent seeking behaviour and high volatility in market prices. These negative effects can be reduced if climate policy decisions have a long-term nature with clear consequences of non-compliance.
Moreover, the markets should be regulated in a transparent manner. A liquid market with many players and different expectations decreases volatility and thus increases "certainty"; it also generates a lobbying potential that will make it difficult to enact political decisions that negatively impact the market. An independent institution overseeing international climate policy, acting like a central bank could be a solution, yet currently is politically unimaginable.
Annex I -Glossary of Frequently Used Terms 25
Abbreviation and Explanation of most frequently used terms: AAU Assigned Amount Unit: The quantity of greenhouse gases that an Annex I country can release in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, during the first commitment period of that protocol . Annex I Annex I Parties: The industrialized countries listed in this annex to the Convention which
